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After the revolutionary changes in 1989 and following dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact, Bulgaria remained alone and unsecured on the Balkan Peninsula. On 17 February
1997 the Bulgarian Government approved a decision on the country's full membership in
NATO. This decision was reached after carefully considering of the possible strategic
choices for Bulgaria's national security. All possible consequences (political, military-
strategic, financial-economic, and social and legal) from this decision were taken into
account. This thesis presents the real situation on the Balkans: economic conditions
within Bulgaria and its neighbors, the countries' military expenditures, their armed
forces, and arms transfers. In order to evaluate the costs and benefits for Bulgaria joining
NATO and to show the advantages of integration, a model ofNATO enlargement on the
Balkans is created. The simulation of the model clearly shows that independent of the
scenario of Bulgaria's integration in a system for common security on the Balkans, all of
the countries included in this integration process benefit from it. These benefits include
considerable drops in countries' military expenditures and increases in their national
security. The methodology presented in the thesis could be used for further study in






B. BULGARIA'S CHOICE 2
1. Application for membership 2
2. The Neutrality as an Alternative 3
3
.
The European Security and Defense Identity as an alternative 5
4. NATO as an Alternative 7
C. BULGARIA IN NATO: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF INTEGRATION ... 9
1. Political Consequences 9
2. Military-Strategic Consequences 12
3. Financial-Economic Aspects 14
4. Social and Legal Consequences 20




A. MILITARY STRENGTH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 25
1. Changes in 1990's 25
2. Risks to security 27
B. WELFARE AND SECURITY 30
1. Introduction 30
2. NATO enlargement on The Balkan Peninsula 3
1
C. UTILITY FUNCTION OF A COUNTRY 34
1. National defense and utility function 34
2. Utility function of an individual country 35
3. Multi-country model 35
D. GNP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES .. 36
1. GNP and population growth 36
vn
2. Military expenditures 39
3. Armed forces ofthe Balkan countries 41
4. Arms transfers 43
m. SIMULATION OF THE MODEL FOR COMMON SECURITY 47
A. A MODEL OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON THE BALKANS 47
1. NATO and the countries on the Balkan Peninsula 47
2. Different Scenarios of integration 48
B. ISOLATION CASE VERSUS NASH CASE 49
1. Isolation case 49
2. Nash case 50
C. SCENARIOS WITH TWO ALLIES 53
1. Bulgaria and Greece 53
2. Bulgaria and Turkey 55
3. Bulgaria and NATO 56
4. Bulgaria and (NATO + Romania) 57
D. THREE ALLIES SCENARIO 58
E. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FOR BULGARIA 59
1. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable GNP 59
2. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable threat perception 60
3. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable E12 62
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 65
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 65
1. The only possible choice 65
2. Bulgaria and its neighbors 65
3. Alliances and benefits 66
4. Bulgaria's relative benefits 67
B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 68
1. GNP of the countries 68
2. Perceived threat 68
3. Commitment from the allies 69
Vlll
4. Assessing the advantages 69
5. Evaluation of expenditures for joining NATO 70
C. RECOMENDATIONS 70
1. National security at lower cost 70
2. Broader enlargement of the Alliance 71
3. Economic cooperation 71
APPENDIX A. GNP, ARMED FORCES, AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES 73
APPENDLX B. SOLVING OF THREE ALLIES' SCENARIO 79
APPENDLXC. BULGARIA'S RELATIVE BENEFITS 81
LIST OF REFERENCES 83




Figure 2.1. Gross National Product by country 38
Figure 2.2. Population by country 38
Figure 2.3. Gross National Product per capita 40
Figure 2.4. Military expenditures by country 40
Figure 2.5. Military expenditures per GNP by country 42
Figure 2.6. Military expenditures per capita 42
Figure 2.7. Armed forces by country 44
Figure 2.8. Armed forces per 1,000 people 44
Figure 2.9. Arms imports by country 45
Figure 2.10. Arms exports by country 45
Figure 3.1. Countries on the Balkan Peninsula 47
Figure 3.2. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable G2 61
Figure 3.3. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable Gl 61
Figure 3.4. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable T2 63




A. THE NEW NATO
After the dramatic events in 1989 and the revolutionary changes of the following
years the United States was left as the sole superpower and NATO the sole alliance. In
less than 10 months, on 4 April 1999, NATO will celebrate its 50th Anniversary. Despite
this fact the Alliance has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to the changing world
and to equip itself with the necessary new ideas to ensure that it will remain an effective
and relevant Euro-Atlantic security institution in the 21
st
Century [2].
The end of Cold War provided a stimulus for introducing NATO's new strategic
concept. This concept, accepted in Rome in November 1991, raised the question about
NATO's future as a military organization. The participants in the summit agreed that the
"Threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has
effectively been removed and is thus no longer a focus for Allied strategy." However, new
potential dangers arise from the wreckage of the Soviet block—ethnic tensions in the new
republics, territorial disputes between former members of the Warsaw Pact, grave
economic crisis in these countries. The new strategic concept looked ahead to a minimal
force, nuclear and conventional to cope with problems stemming from instability and
disorder rather than from the single powerful entity that NATO had confronted for many
years.
Today, with the changing security environment, integration has become the
defining characteristic of the political environment in Europe. A European architecture
based on indifference cannot be a stable construction. So the enlargement ofNATO is a
strategic imperative. It is an investment in a secure Europe. The process of NATO
enlargement started in July 1997 in Madrid with the invitation to former members of the
Warsaw Pact, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, to join the Alliance.
The Heads of State and Government at the Madrid meeting also reaffirmed that
the door remains open to other European nations which aspire to Alliance membership,
giving them an opportunity to demonstrate their ability and willingness to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty. No European democratic
country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from
consideration.
At Madrid, the Participants also recognized the positive movement toward
democracy and the rule of law in a number of Southeastern European countries. They
recognized the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the
countries in this sub-region of Europe, and the need to promote their increasing
integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. "This specific recognition of Southeastern
Europe should put to rest any notion of relegating this region to an area of secondary
importance." [8]
B. BULGARIA'S CHOICE
1. Application for membership
On 17 February 1997, after years of unclear intentions, the interim Bulgarian
Government unanimously adopted a decision on full membership in NATO. In Bulgaria,
joining NATO is regarded as an expression of the country's traditional membership in the
Euro-Atlantic civilization and a natural component of its striving to integrate in its major
economic and defense institutions. Text in the National security Concept, adopted on
April 16, 1998, says: "Bulgaria's national priority is its NATO membership."
The debate concerning the Bulgarian attitude toward NATO is often
oversimplified, referring only to its military side. However, this problem has many aspects
with roots in the political and military spheres, as well as in the economy, the legal system,
the social situation, and even in the psychological disposition of the population and the
political elite.
The strategic choice in Bulgaria's national security was between three alternatives:
creating a Bulgarian neutrality system within the European security architecture;
integrating with the future European defense identity in the system of the European Union
(EU); or the Bulgarian integration in the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance,
assuming that NATO, with its enlargement to the East, will evolve into a system of
collective security.
Each one ofthese choices has its advantages, which are supported and defended by
wide circles of politicians and public figures. Support for these options is based on specific
historical and current political arguments.
2. The Neutrality as an Alternative
It must be admitted that the "neutrality" alternative is exceptionally tempting,
especially considering that all main Twentieth century events in Bulgarian national security
policy have ended with failure from a political point of view. Examples of fiascos of
Bulgarian policy during the Twentieth century include the outcome of the Allies war
(1912-1913), the First World War (1916-1918), the Second World War, and finally the
Cold War. Most of Bulgaria's misfortunes result from the fact that the country has been
integrated into one or another opposing coalition and by a sad coincidence of events, the
chosen coalition has always been the losing side. This is the main historic argument
supporting the thesis of some Bulgarian politicians and public figures—fighters for
Bulgaria's policy of neutrality.
In assessing this idea we should decide if the proposed neutral status of Bulgaria
could be implemented now or in the foreseeable future. There are three types of neutrality:
traditional, structural, and satellite neutrality [7].
a) Traditional neutrality
This is a fully unrealistic idea. Many years of active neutral status are
needed to integrate a country into a balanced international system, and to ensure potential
adversaries will have no interest in its destruction or violation.
b) Structural neutrality
This system has been implemented in Austria since 1955 and in Yugoslavia
after 1949, but it evolved in quite a different international environment. The bipolar system
in Europe that precipitated this type of neutrality doesn't exist anymore. The new
international system replacing the previous one needs a long time to form, modify, and
stabilize. Considering the current situation in international relations, we can assume that
establishing this type of stable neutrality status will encounter huge obstacles in the present
international situation. There is no a major player in Europe interested in and ready to
guarantee the status of structural neutrality for a small state in the European periphery.
c) Satellite neutrality
An example for this type of neutrality is Finland after the WW EI. This
neutrality was achieved through a direct linkage with the former USSR. This neutrality
variant is somewhat preferable to the previous two alternatives, but it also has weak
aspects. Satellite neutrality may allow Bulgaria to receive serious foreign support, but will
require that Bulgaria strictly support the interests of its "protector." For many years,
Bulgaria followed this type of neutrality as well as a direct attachment to one or another
great power. Continuing this policy in the context of the changing international relations
inevitably will lead the country to a new national disaster. Considering the dynamics and
unpredictability of the international processes, even the linkage to a stable and strong
international power can not guarantee Bulgaria a long-term defense of its national
interests.
3. The European Security and Defense Identity as an alternative
Launched in 1948 by the UK, France, and the Benelux states as a response to a
growing Soviet threat, the West-European Union (WEU) has remained for many years in
NATO's shadow, fulfilling a symbolic and potential role—but no real function. Today,
WEU is emerging from that shadow and now has both greater responsibilities and military
and organizational capacities than at any time in its 50-year existence.
The WEU has four main, although limited, functions. Together, they are enough to
justify the organization's existence and to make strengthening it a good idea in principle.
• Identity and visibility. WEU gives an "identity" to European security and defense
efforts that the Europeans strive to maintain and strengthen after the Cold War. In
supporting this idea NATO adopted a declaration to develop a European security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) in January 1994, and agreed to create WEU-led Combined Joint
Task Forces (CJTF) in June 1996.
• Performing military missions. WEU has already performed some military
missions, however most of them were under NATO; the WEU label was primarily
symbolic. In the future, the organization may acquire a more practical military role.
• Extending to the East. In addition to its ten full members, the WEU has three
Associate Members, nine Associate Partners (including Bulgaria), and five observers. This
makes the WEU Europe's only security organization involving nearly all the Europeans,
but excluding the US and Russia. WEU outreach is a useful way of involving non-EU
members in important and practical steps for enhancing European security. An example is
the participation of Bulgaria in the WEU's Danube operation during the war in
Yugoslavia.
• Providing for Europe's defense. Article 5 of the WEU treaty requires all
signatories to give "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" to any of
the allies that are the object of an armed attack in Europe. But as long as NATO persists
in Europe, it is hard to imagine a full-scale attack over a state member of WEU. NATO
remains Europe's defense guarantee; if the WEU has to play military roles, they are
beyond the borders of its current members.
The association and eventual incorporation ofBulgaria in the EU is important from
a national security point ofview. First, it is expected that Bulgaria's membership in the EU
will help us to overcome the backwardness of our technology. Second, it is possible to
obtain additional security guarantees connected with the growing EU tendency for
coordinating the foreign policy. Finally, it will increase opportunities for a jwider
partnership in the area of domestic problems, including co-operation for preventing
terrorism, illegal drug-traffic etc.
Becoming a future EU member, Bulgaria should be able to cooperate in all three
main "columns" of the EU: the free movement of people and goods; cooperation in the
field of foreign policy, security and defense; cooperation in the internal affairs, legal
systems and the entire complex of measures connected with the fight against the organized
crime, including the traffic of illegal drugs and weapons. As an Associate Partner, Bulgaria
has an obligation and interest in adjusting its system to the EU requirements, so that when
it becomes a full member of the Union it will be a reliable and effective partner in all three
"columns."
However, transforming the idea of a European Security and Defense Identity into a
viable and effective structure with significant attractiveness for the entire continent,
requires at least three main prerequisites:
- establishing a federal EU with common foreign and internal policies;
- developing integrated conventional armed forces; and
- forming an independent European nuclear potential.
Bulgaria has to prove its potential as a factor in the security and progress in South
Eastern Europe, especially in forming a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
a Common Defense Policy (CDP) within the EU. By full commitment of its policy to this
strategic goal, Bulgaria must convince the EU to "discover" it as a key country; as a point
of support for the interests of the Union in South Eastern Europe. These interests should
be based not only on creating a shield against the potential threats for the European
security, but also on the real possibilities for Bulgaria to play a stabilizing role using the
means of cooperation and interaction with the EU as well as with the other countries in
the region.
We must, however, emphasize the fundamental association between the European
Security and Defense Identity and NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is and
will be a fundamental instrument of the common defense of the integrated part of the
Euro-Atlantic space. The other institutions and functional mechanisms will service
additional roles and missions.
Analyzing the current situation, the choice of the leading national ideal is to be the
determining factor for the adequacy of each of the alternatives for the national interests.
The main hypothesis ruling the discussion on this problem is that Bulgaria's total
integration into the existing and developing European structures is generally accepted. The
Bulgarian choice "to be in Europe" has no alternative. The main assumption is that
Bulgaria joining NATO is a step that will legitimize the clear interests and goals of the
country, and move it ahead towards full integration into the European civilization.
4. NATO as an Alternative
Never before has NATO's significance and role for security in Europe been so
clear and above doubt. After the end of Cold War, lacking an imminent military threat, the
most fundamental reason for the cohesion ofthe Atlantic Alliance is weakening.
NATO, however, will not disappear. Many challenges to the interests of the US
and Europe remain. When we add the common culture and values, we will create a bias
towards transatlantic integration. If Americans want to preserve the credibility of a proven
Alliance, they should demonstrate their continued commitment, even when the
commitment has a cost. Europeans should do all they can to ensure American
involvement, but they should prepare for a day when US commitment will begin to wane.
It is obvious that some reforms in the Atlantic Alliance have to be carried out
having in mind two questions [7]:
a) What ideas ofthe Washington Treaty have to bepreserved?
The answer to this question refers to the philosophy of the Alliance at its
establishment (1949), most precisely expressed in the words of its first chairman, Lord
Ismey: "NATO was created to hold the Russians out, the Americans—in, and the
Germans—down." According to today's realities this formula is generally interpreted in
the West as follows [7]:
- NATO has to continue to involve the USA in European security;
- NATO has to maintain its organizational and administrative structures
and procedures to remain a successful instrument for preserving security by its tactical
military power;
- NATO has to continue to restrain the development of national military
forces by their integration into the Alliance's structures and using different forms of then-
restriction through international legal instruments; and
- NATO has to continue to participate in maintaining the balance and the
military dimensions of the parity with the existing European military superpower—Russia.
More precisely it should not allow abuse with military power in international relations.
b) What changes have to be made so thatNATO becomes what
Europe needs—an effective common security system?
The answer to the second question refers to the necessary changes for
NATO to become what Manfred Werner called an "anchor of the European security." For
its transformation from a military-political Alliance into a common security system, NATO
obviously has to change [7]:
- the conceptual balance between the two columns of the Alliance, the
European and the American, which can be achieved through the redistribution of priorities
and responsibilities;
- the main concepts of the allied military strategy as well as the related
military structures and procedures for politico-military decision making;
- the concept ofthe relations with Russia; and
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- the understanding of its role in zones outside the ones determined by the
Washington Treaty (Article VI).
The answer to the first of the above stated questions depends entirely on
the prerogatives of the NATO member states, while the solution of the second is much
more complex. To create an effective common security system from the existing defense
organization NATO, all states which have a vision of the common European security can
not only express opinions but may also have a direct influence. This aspect pragmatically
focuses the work on the consequences for Bulgaria of eventually joining the Alliance,
transformed as a system for common security and defense.
C. BULGARIA IN NATO: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF INTEGRATION
Including Bulgaria in the Euro-Atlantic structures will substantially affect the
country's internal and external policy. The new status of Bulgaria will be connected with
changes in the decision-making system, in the system of defense, and in the national
system for defense control. This will have a powerful impact over the civil-military
relations and on the defense industry. All these changes will possibly lead to secondary
changes in the social sphere. They will bring new elements to the Bulgarians' psychology
and mentality.
Considering the simultaneous effects of different factors in the process of joining
NATO, it is necessary to assess its positive and negative sides. We need to fulfil this
assessment in order to achieve the multiple positive effect from the full membership.
1. Political Consequences
Estimating the consequences ofjoining NATO, we should know that after the end
of the Cold War the political considerations dominate by their range, depth, and influence
over the military ones. The most important among them are [7]:
a) Positive consequences
• Final and unambiguous political choice.
The country joins a democratic world with clear parameters, rules, and
perspectives. In the new reality Bulgaria will have an opportunity for a successful
development and full use of its national sovereignty. Being a member of NATO, the
sovereignty of the country will be guaranteed to the extent that the Alliance forces the
allies (and not only them) to conform to it. The implementation of this mechanism requires
political consultations based on clear and worked out principles and traditions: the fair
exchange of opinions and positions between governments; the desire to respect the
interests of the different member states, independently of their political, economic and
military power; and understanding that successful co-operation means sharing the threats
and guarantees as well as the responsibilities and benefits. Joining NATO we will enter an
environment where we can develop our national security strategy framed by certain rules
and according to the common interests but fully respecting the national goal and priorities.
• Political and military system with great potential and international
prestige.
It is generally recognized that NATO is a successful alliance. Contrary to
expectations, the alliance did not lose its motivation for existence after the collapse of the
Warsaw Treaty. Today nobody doubts the ability of NATO to play the most important
role in creating a common foundation for a new European security system. The reason for
benefit of the zone of security and stability that NATO extends over its members is that it
is simple and reasonable national security to be guaranteed by a multinational organization.
• Preconditions for new political, economic and military relations with the
leading countries of the world.
Joining NATO, Bulgaria enters a zone of higher security that automatically
will change positively the political and economic attractiveness of the country. The
excuses of foreign investors about the unsuitability of conditions in capital investment will
be neutralized to a certain degree. We will have a real opportunity to conduct regular
consultations at the highest political level, which will have direct positive consequences for
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policy, security, and the economy. Six of the seven most developed countries of the world
who control the international financial institutions are NATO members. It is politically
inadmissible to pass the possibility to join the Alliance, especially when the country has
such enormous needs for support in practically all spheres. Joining NATO will strongly
consolidate the Bulgarian position on its road to a full EU membership.
• A basis for a new stabilization process in South-Eastern Europe.
In this new by its character, scale, and potential process Bulgaria can play
major roles. Joining a system for common security, Bulgaria's regional policy will gain a
completely new direction and weight. The policy of active neutrality as applied during the
Yugoslav crisis could be replaced by a policy of cooperation, interaction and involvement.
All conditions are at hand for Bulgaria to become a positive influence for regional security.
Combining the accumulated experience with the support ofNATO can provide us with
dividends that will fully "cover" the possible negatives ofjoining NATO. Being a member
of the Alliance, Bulgaria will find itself in a situation where most of the countries in the
region will have coinciding strategic interests instead of strategic contradictions.
• The external guarantees of national security will provide deterrence that
in Bulgaria's case is much more valuable than the ability for immediate defense only.
• Adaptation ofthe country to numerous NATO standards, documents, and
agreements.
This process will also simultaneously solve a series of problems, including:
consolidating the division of authority, formatting democratic civil-military relations, and
adopting appropriate rules for people and goods crossing the borders. A new internal and
external environment will be created, favorable for international economic projects of
strategic significance. Better possibilities for participation in the international division of
labor in the sphere of defense will be created.
b) Negative consequences
The political consequences ofjoining a system for common security may be
assessed considering those factors that in a certain stage and at a certain degree could be
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negative for some aspects of Bulgaria's national security. The most significant among
them are:
• Joining NATO, Bulgaria will have to form a new system of political
decision-making resembling the spirit and style used in NATO. In the beginning, the
system may cause political and public dissatisfaction that in exceptional and electoral
situations might represent a serious danger. An important reason for such possible
consequences lies in the insufficient information concerning the status, the activities and
the perspectives ofNATO available both to politicians and the general public.
• Being a member of the Alliance, Bulgaria could be an object of a nuclear
attack during a global conflict, regardless ofwhether or not nuclear weapons are based on
its territory. Although such a possibility has a limited probability, it should not be ignored.
• In 1997 NATO made a decisive contribution to achieving a new Europe,
undivided, free, and secure. Despite the NATO-Russia Founding Act and Russia's
inclusion in the PfP program, our relations with Russia will be changed and complicated,
at least in the beginning. For a certain period, Bulgaria may have difficulty with its
strategic resources; the armed forces may face supply and maintenance problems.
2. Military-Strategic Consequences
The military-strategic consequences are especially important not only for
Bulgaria's membership in this system for international security, but also for the NATO
expansion in general. Unlike political consequences, the military consequences are visible,
measurable, and controllable. The paradox is that the positive consequences for our
country might be negative for NATO itself. In this case, it is important to evaluate even
numerically both positive and negative consequences for Bulgaria from a military-strategic




• The problem of the country's negative defense balance with our neighbors
in the context ofCFE will be addressed, though not solved.
• The allied status will offer the best opportunities for rational and most
effective use of the national resources in the spheres of defense and security.
• The entire territory of Bulgaria will become an integral part of the
European defense zone under NATO control.
• The deterrent potential of NATO's political and military power will
increase the ability of our country to effectively influence the escalation of the international
disputes, conflicts and crises directed against the state and its interests.
• Military intelligence information available from NATO will help the
decision making process on problems which are of strategic importance for the national
security.
• A coalition military doctrine that meets the requirements of the
contemporary world will be adopted. At the same time, the specific military planning
corresponding to the national requirements will be maintained.
• NATO membership will help accelerate reorganization and modernization
of the forces that Bulgaria places under Alliance management.
• Bulgarian experts and research institutions will gain expanded access to
state-of-the-art technologies in weapons, communications, and equipment.
• The process of a gradual standardization in the defense will be initiated by
introducing more sophisticated armament and equipment than the country could now
afford.
• Broad participation in different peace keeping missions will have a
positive effect on personnel training and on the combat training ofthe military units.
• The Bulgarian government will be obliged to follow certain rules in their
defense policy, including in the financial and material provisions for defense.
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b) Negative consequences
The negative military-strategic consequences of the Bulgaria's integration
in NATO will be a function of the geopolitical location of the country rather than of the
specific military policy that the Bulgarian government could adopt.
• In accordance with its allied duties, Bulgaria could potentially be directly
or indirectly involved in a military conflict linked with any member ofNATO.
• The possibility of a military conflict emerging at the border of NATO's
zone of responsibility is the dominating military threat that can expand and escalate
involving members of the Alliance.
• The threats of terrorist activities against "the West" and NATO in general
can make Bulgaria a target as well. This possibility is especially dangerous in the context
ofthe fundamentalist expansion.
• Joining a system for common security, Bulgaria will be obliged to accept
some kind of foreign military presence: traffic through our air space and territorial water;
multinational military exercises; establishment of infrastructures, communication centers
and channels; access to air traffic and naval control and navigation, etc. Bulgaria should
allow access to important information, including the country's mobilization resources.
• As aNATO member, Bulgaria will be in the periphery of its responsibility
zone that makes the country automatically an object of high intelligence interest for non-
NATO members.
3. Financial-Economic Aspects
In the political debate on Bulgaria's joining NATO, the financial aspect is being
considered mainly by the opponents of the integration in an oversimplified manner. They
overwhelm the society with misleading information based on the following assumptions:
• the expenses for joining are detached artificially from those for the national
defense and security that unconditionally have to be made anyway;
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• the expenses for joining are presented as a total cost without any explanation
about time period over which they will be spent, i.e. joining NATO is regarded as an act
rather than as a bilateral process which continues for a long time—more than 10 years;
• there is no analysis regarding the possible contribution of the national defense
industry (and possible benefits for the country) in the process of a technical rearmament;
and
• the specialists in Bulgaria who are acquainted with standardization in NATO are
still few; they are not familiar with the process of standardization and the future technical
modernization of the NATO armed forces according to the concept of the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF), the NATO programs concerning investment in different spheres of the
security, applied and scientific research, infrastructure, communications etc.
In this thesis it is impossible to address the problem thoroughly. However, it is
important to discuss the relation and the interdependence of defense expenses. It is also
important to discuss the strength of the armed forces at a strategic level and the
perspective for their modernization.
The analysis of the financial and economic side of the problem has to produce an
answer for three fundamental questions:
a) "Adequacy " ofthefinancial efforts that has to be made
What resources are required for defense and security to achieve the
established political goals without harming the economic stability and the potential for
steady development of the country?
b) The "economy" ofthefinancial efforts ofthe member state
How to ensure efficiency in the defense and security related expenditures
incorporating the Alliance's cooperation and specialization possibilities and the particular
interest of every member state?
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c) The "fair"financial effort ofeach member state
We can restate this question as how equitably to distribute the financial
burden among the Alliance's members?
According to the NATO definition, a country's defense expenses include:
• all expenses for the national armed forces including pensions for retired
servicemen and civilian military personnel;
• the expenses of the host country for the NATO forces, units or structures from
other countries;
• the NATO determined common financial payments covering the expenses of the
civil and military personnel of the Alliance and the allied infrastructure;
• the military (financial and material) aid for other countries; and
• the expenses for paramilitary structures that are important for defense.
Table 1.1 shows the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita for the world, for
NATO, for NATO members on the Balkan Peninsula—Greece and Turkey, and for
Bulgaria. The available data are for the 11 years from 1985 till 1995. Data are presented in
thousand constant 1995 dollars calculated according to their Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) [12].
Comparing Bulgaria's GNP per capita with that for the world, we see some
equality. During the 80's, Bulgaria's GNP was slightly above the world average; during
the 90' s it was slightly below the world average. The main reason for the decreasing
relative Bulgarian GNP during the later period was the grave economic crisis after the
collapse of COMECOM (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). At the same time,
Bulgaria's economic data are well below the average data for NATO, but they are
between the Greek and Turkish data for GNP per capita. Considering that Greece and
Turkey are our neighbors on the Balkan Peninsula, and important members ofNATO in
this region, Bulgaria's economic performance is relatively good and should not serve as a
reason for considering Bulgaria as a "secondary candidate" in this sense.
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Year GNP per capita in thousand constant $ 1995
World NATO Greece Turkey Bulgaria
1985 5.246 19.410 7.656 2.100 6.316
1986 5.317 19.850 7.729 2.240 6.468
1987 5.397 20.280 7.687 2.423 6.473
1988 5.546 20.930 8.044 2.438 6.668
1989 5.634 21.460 8.264 2.367 6.609
1990 5.618 21.210 8.114 2.536 5.805
1991 5.558 21.100 8.326 2.525 4.574
1992 5.346 21.310 8.351 2.618 4.476
1993 5.337 21.320 8.414 2.775 4.438
1994 5.402 21.790 8.505 2.597 4.435
1995 5.459 22.090 8.696 2.714 4.394
Table 1.1. GNP per capita
Table 1.2 shows armed forces per 1,000 people for the world, for NATO, for
NATO members on the Balkan Peninsula, and for Bulgaria. These data are for the same
11 years—between 1985 and 1995 [12].
Year Armec forces per 1,000 people [soldiers]
MM NATO Bmm Turkey Bulgaria
1985 5.8 9.3 20.2 16.1 21.2
1986 5.8 9.4 20.3 16.6 21.2
1987 5.7 9.3 19.9 16.6 21.3
1988 5.6 9.2 19.9 15.7 17.8
1989 5.5 8.9 20.0 14.2 16.6
1990 5.3 8.5 19.9 13.7 14.4
1991 4.9 8.2 19.9 14.1 12.0
1992 4.5 7.5 20.1 12.1 11.2
1993 4.3 7.1 20.5 11.6 6.1
1994 4.2 7.0 19.7 13.4 9.4
1995 4.0 6.7 20.3 13.1 10.0
Table 1.2. Armed forces per 1,000 people
17
The obvious conclusion is that the number of the military personnel relative to the
Bulgarian population is almost twice as high as the average for the NATO members. This
proportion is much higher when we compare our armed forces per 1,000 people with the
average for the world. While Bulgaria's data in the 1990's are lower than those for Greece
and Turkey, they are still substantial. According to NATO's interest in our possible
membership, this should be considered as a positive factor.
Table 1.3 contains the Military Expenditures (ME) per capita for the world,
NATO, NATO members on the Balkan Peninsula, and Bulgaria in constant 1995 dollars
for the same 11 years [12].
Year Military Expenditures per capita in constant $ 1995
iiiia NATO Greece Turkey Bulgaria
1985 275 907 538 97 890
1986 276 935 480 110 926
1987 272 932 487 80 931
1988 265 908 505 72 816
1989 252 900 477 74 784
1990 241 855 475 89 498
1991 217 780 450 94 181
1992 193 787 472 100 145
1993 174 748 466 108 128
1994 161 710 472 105 118
1995 152 668 482 108 125
Table 1.3. Military expenditures per capita
Due to the low level of the budget expenses for defense in the 90' s, the military
expenditures per capita are much lower in comparison with the average numbers for
NATO and for Greece. However, those numbers are slightly higher than in Turkey.
Looking at military expenditures of Bulgaria in late 80' s, we may conclude that after
restoration of country's economic performance, Bulgaria could increase its military efforts
if necessary. In this case, Bulgaria would be an important member of NATO and
contributor to the European security on the Balkan Peninsula.
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Although incomplete, the analysis outlines the type of problems, which have to be
solved and to be taken into account in the integration policy:
• It is possible that NATO will not translate the financial question into a main
problem of the negotiations concerning admitting new members, including Bulgaria.
NATO is well aware that immediately increasing the requirements for financial
cooperation will decrease the general economic indicators of the candidates, increase
social tension, and decrease of the attractiveness of the NATO membership.
• Costs ofNATO enlargement
The February 1998 Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and
Costs of NATO Enlargement states that [14]: "The addition of three invitees (Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic) will require approximately $1.5 billion in NATO
common-funded costs over the next ten years (from 1998 through 2008). The United
States currently provides about 25 percent of these common-funded budgets, and will
continue to do so after the addition of the new members." The US costs of admitting the
first three countries into NATO will be no more than $400 million for ten years,
approximately the same cost absorbed by the three invitees. There is no appropriate
calculation of the costs of accessing Bulgaria into the Alliance, but knowing the size of the
country, its military, and the current practice we can drew some conclusions.
The cost of including of Bulgaria in this future system for common security will be
approximately $300-400 million over the first ten years and the country should pay a small
portion of it. This portion will be no more than $100 million.
• Independently of the current perspective to successfully integrate new members
into NATO, Bulgaria should participate in all existing NATO cooperation programs for
armed forces modernization in order to prevent any military crises. We should strive to
gain as much external military aid as possible. We should seek NATO assistance for
solving concrete problems in our armed forces, involving the Alliance with our problems
at an operative level and provoking higher political interest.
• Developing the concept for the Combined Joint Task Force will profoundly
change the direction of NATO's efforts. It is possible that the character of the military
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activity and the related expenses can be changed in a manner that this inevitably will
influence all countries on the continent. The new NATO function as an instrument for
military conflict prevention will require a new approach to the structure of the military
forces, their training and complex maintenance. The exact CJTF formula is still not
formulated in NATO so Bulgaria can participate in the process from the very beginning.
• The alternative political choice - guaranteed neutrality - from the point ofview of
the related defense costs, has a similar financial price as NATO membership. If we
consider, however, the need for total technological innovation in the medium aspects, the
expenses for neutral status will be beyond Bulgaria's ability to pay.
4. Social and Legal Consequences
The integration process inevitably will reflect on the legal system of national
defense as well as on numerous aspects of the social sphere. Joining NATO assumes that
military personnel will migrate to and from Bulgaria, and that there may be a constant
foreign military presence including weapons. From a legal point of view, a normative
environment has to be provided as close as possible to the one in the Alliance. In this
respect, it will be necessary not only to conclude a considerable number of agreements (bi-
and multilateral) but also to ensure real conditions for their observance (tax regulations,
visas, documentation etc.).
The problem of using and controlling Bulgarian forces on foreign territory will
have to be regulated in a much more detailed way than is done in the Bulgarian Defense
and Armed Forces Law (BDAFL). Moreover, the rules have to conform to the ordinary
training activities of the units with different scales as well as with the cases demanding
urgent action in accordance with CJTF.
The establishment of the civil-military relations in Bulgaria has to be accomplished
during the admission process. The law in force (BDAFL) is far from sufficient. The
adoption of an alternative service law, laws concerning different institutions associated
with the armed forces activities, a new formulation of the State and Military Secrets Law,
laws regulating financial and economic obligations of the judicial subjects toward the
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mobilization and combat readiness of the country etc. are especially needed. Moreover
some corrections in current normative acts have to be made, motivated by the experience
accumulated in their application as well as by the specific requirements of the NATO
membership.
In the social field, the changes will be determined by the admission formula: either
full membership with the whole scope of rights and obligations referred to in the
Washington Treaty or a "restricted" membership. In both cases, however, the most
important social question probably will be the further professionalization of the armed
forces.
The presence of Bulgarian forces on foreign territory, the participation of
Bulgarian military personnel in the allied command structures and control and logistic
structures will introduce completely new dimensions compared to current practice. The
intensified international activity will not only increase the requirements on generals,
officers and sergeants, soldiers and civil personnel, but also will inevitably increase the
prestige ofthe military profession, of its social status and attractiveness.
The extension of allied missions and elements of its infrastructure will change the
social climate in the regions concerned. The changes have to be foreseen and controlled
purposely to prevent potentially negative aspects and to promote positive ones.
Concluding this section, an important condition concerning the methodological
base of the policy regarding NATO has to be outlined. The positive and the negative
aspects of membership should not be balanced by "a simple counting." NATO membership
should not be considered separately from Bulgarian participation in the All-European
process. As was already emphasized, the starting point of any national policy is the leading
national idea. If this idea is common welfare, political responsibility for Bulgaria's future
and strategic thinking, then it will be possible for the government and society to block and
neutralize the negative factors and to develop and realize the positive ones regarding
attitudes towards the Alliance.
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D. BULGARIA OUTSIDE NATO: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-
INTEGRATION
There is another potential alternative for Bulgaria—staying outside NATO. It
unites many sub alternatives, primarily involving the theme of "neutrality." Some general
comments about the possible influence of the "non-NATO" option on the general political
future ofBulgaria and on its national security are presented here. In particular [7]:
• The process of implementing Bulgaria's strategic goal—a full membership in the
European political, economic, and defense structures—will be delayed considerably. The
economic conditions which the country has to achieve will become the primary concern
for EU membership (i.e., there the economic corrective on the political and economic
advisability will be missing). The attitude towards Bulgaria will reflect the judgement that
if a country is not attractive from a strategic and military-political point of view then it is
not suitable for economic expansion as well.
• Bulgaria will find itself in the buffer zone between the West and Russia and for a
long period will be considered an unattractive partner in the political and economic
spheres. The political will of the international financial institutions for supporting broad
structural reforms will decrease sharply.
• External guarantees against the traditional sources of military threat will not be
provided. There will not be only real chance to benefit from any support for our national
security priorities.
• In domestic aspect the ideas for restoring of the status quo before 1990 will be
revitalized systematically. A strong motive for seeking abstract external and internal
political alternatives will be generated, that will lead to a non-productive waste of national
resources and to a permanent "pendulum syndrome" in political affairs. This inevitably will
generate permanent interest by regional superpowers in our internal affairs.
• Restructuring and modernizing of the armed forces will become a self-
perpetuating process. The technological backwardness in all defense spheres will
aggravate the negative security balance with our neighbors.
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• The feeling of insecurity of the state and the nation will be permanently
implanted into the Bulgarian's mentality. The impression of isolation and hostility by "the
Europeans" will increase. The political contradictions between the generations will
deepen; the accusations about lost chances will become a strong motivating factor in
political debates.
• Economic problems and insecurity will encourage the emigration of young
Bulgarians. Added to the natural decline of the nation, emigration will generate more
serious problems after one generation.
Numerous other consequences can be listed as a result of Bulgaria's decision for
abandoning the integration policy. However, the main consequence is that Bulgaria will
need to seek another political model, other systems of values, and other mechanisms for
guaranteeing the national security. Strategic political solutions should carefully consider
whether Bulgaria is a suitable country to implement the new political model.
E. SUMMARY
At the moment and in the beginning of next centuryNATO enlargement will be the
most dynamic process in the architecture of common European security. Its intensity and
priorities will be mostly influenced by the following factors: accomplishing the SFOR in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; developing relations with the Ukraine and Russia; Bulgaria's
integration within the EU; the WEU's ability to prepare for future missions; and the
willingness and ability of the candidates for EU membership to comply with the program-
minimum for joining.
Bulgaria's policy towards NATO integration is one of the greatest challenges in
the transition period. By deciding to join the Alliance, Bulgaria makes its final political
choice. Joining NATO will rapidly change the national defense system and the guarantees
for national security. NATO membership will provoke new goals and targets for foreign
and domestic policy. It will mean taking new responsibilities. But the implications for
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missing this chance when the country gravely needs assistance are politically unacceptable.
Moreover, it should be remembered that the NATO states practically control international
financial institutions; this obviously will be a leading factor for economic transition in
Bulgaria. Joining NATO will consolidate Bulgaria's position on the path to a full
membership in the EU.
NATO membership is creating a wide basis for establishing a new character, scale,
and potential participation in different international institutions. Contacts provided through
NATO represent the leading countries in the security sphere, including the USA,
Germany, France, and the UK. Russia takes part in the discussion ofthe European security
problems. National interest obliges us to be a part of the Common-European process. We
have to be aware of the attitudes and the tendencies in the security structures and in the
policy of leading European countries and our neighbors to prevent surprises from political
or security decisions. We have to participate in the decision making process, especially in
decisions that ultimately concerns us. All activity in the foreign policy, economy, security,
and defense spheres has two main goals: (1) establishing a political, economic and social
model which contributes as much as possible to improving the people's welfare, and (2)
guaranteeing personal, public, and state security at the highest possible level.
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H. BACKGROUND
A. MILITARY STRENGTH AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Changes in 1990's
Since the early 1990's, the national security of Bulgaria has been guaranteed
through conditions that are radically different from those in previous decades. The
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact raised the issue of Bulgaria's membership in NATO
(along with the other countries of the former Eastern block). The question arose as a
natural response to the changed geopolitical conditions, not through the current European
policy agenda.
Changes have occurred in the regional context. The Balkans has become an arena
of military conflict within the former Yugoslavia. The outcome of this conflict was the
emergence of some new states—Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This constitutes a threat as different ethnic groups live together in the region
within separate independent states.
Domestic conditions in Bulgaria have changed substantially in the post 1989
period. This has had a direct impact on national security. The democratization of society
has called for the depoliticisation of the armed forces, the enforcement of civilian control
over the military and special services, and the creation of civil society structures, some of
which relate to national security. Economic changes to create a market economy have
called for new ways and means to supply and support the armed forces and maintain of the
military defense production and trade complex.
Under these conditions, Bulgaria started establishing a new national security
system. The new system rests first and foremost on the democratic principles laid down in
Bulgaria's Constitution. The new Constitution (1991) was followed by a series of laws
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pertaining directly or indirectly to national security. Questions pertaining to the police
force and the special services, the state secret service, the institutional changes in security
were codified. At the close of 1995, the Law on Defense and Armed Forces was passed
after five years of drafting under three National Assemblies. Along with regulating
professional and institutional matters for the first time, this law treats the Bulgarian
military as citizens having all rights laid down in the Constitution; it specifically lists the
rights that are curtailed in the interest of national security.
Along with legislative changes in the country's national security processes, change
and adjustment are occurring in the existing national security structures. Some
predominately political organizations were disbanded (like the Volunteer Detachments or
the Organization for the Assistance ofDefense) or adapted to the changed conditions (like
the Civil defense which was transformed into Civil Protection and a number of other key
elements of the country's national defense organization); reorganization is still under way
in the armed forces.
These changes have become publicly known as the military reform. Reorganization
has progressed at a varying pace in the past seven years. A 1995 decision ofthe Council of
Ministers approved the program for reform in the Bulgarian military through 2010. The
democratic joint command of the national security system is gradually gaining currency.
This structure resulted from the actions of the National Assembly, the President of the
republic, and the Council of Ministers. In complete harmony with the international
instruments, the Bulgarian national security system is transparent and sufficiently open to
external control in compliance with the concluded treaties and agreements.
Bulgaria took part in the peace-keeping operations in Cambodia; strictly enforced
the imposed Yugo-embargo; participated in joint NATO exercises within the framework
of the Partnership for Peace initiative; and observed the commitments under the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). Bulgaria pursues a peaceful and
constructive foreign policy internationally and on the Balkans.
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In many ways though, Bulgaria's actions in the field of national security involve
tremendous challenges and risks to security.
2. Risks to security
The risks to security are many and vital. One of the most important reasons is the
growing imbalance in the armed forces and potential of Bulgaria vis a vis its neighbors
—
Turkey, Greece, and Romania. This imbalance, which favors our southern neighbors,
results from implementing the Cascade Plan within the framework of the CFE Treaty. This
plan provides that arms from central Europe should be transferred to the European
periphery in order to achieve balance along the entire NATO border. That balance was
struck when the Warsaw Treaty was in place and is creating a growing imbalance vis a vis
Bulgaria today. According to SIPRI, the USA alone has gratuitously given 1993 tanks,
636 armored vehicles and 180 artillery systems to Greece, Turkey, Norway, Portugal, and
Spain. The results of implementing ofthe CFE Treaty on the Balkan Peninsula can be seen
on Table 2.1 [Almanac Bulgaria]:
Bulgaria-Turkey Bulgaria-Greece Bulgaria-Romania
Before After Before After Before After
Personnel 1:5.09 1 5.09 1:1.61 1 1.5 1:1.45 1:2.2
Tanks 1:1.19 1 1.9 1.40:1 1 1.17 1:1.18 1.07:1
Armored vehicles 1.2:1 1 1.56 1.08:1 1 1.2 1:1.55 1:1.05
Artillery 1:1.29 1 2.0 1.27:1 1 1.07 1:1.54 1.18:1
Combat aircraft 1:1.52 1 3.2 1:1.24 1 2.76 1:1.05 1:1.8
Combat helicopters 44:0 1.5:1 44:0 1 1.49 1:2.36 1:1.56
Table 2.1. Basic indicators for Bulgaria and its neighbors
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The table gives the relative balance of military components before and after the
enforcement of the Treaty. Despite the negative effect that implementing of this plan has
on the country, Bulgaria has stuck to its commitment under the CFE Treaty in the name of
understanding and peace.
Another reason for the difficulties facing Bulgaria's national security includes
disrupted technological relations with countries of the former Eastern Bloc. This tests
Bulgaria's maintenance and operation of military technology and arms in the military.
Bulgaria's most recent military equipment purchases include [Almanac Bulgaria]:
Aircraft (SU-25 fighters) 1988
Tanks and combat helicopters 1985
Armored vehicles 1987
Anti-tank, air defense and radar systems 1989
Ships 1988
The military quickly faced problems that it has not faced before: shortages of
supplies, munitions, spare parts and even provisions. The difficulties can be avoided to an
extent with the efforts of the national defense industry, but this industry is depressed like
the national economy. Furthermore, the army budget allocations are insufficient and affect
the commanders' ability to drill and train soldiers for joint military operations. The army
budget dynamics ofthe past few years indicate the difficulties that the army confronts.
One of the most complicated problems that the country faces is how to guarantee
national security in the period in which Bulgaria is not a member ofNATO and will have
to ensure its own self-defense. Under the Warsaw Treaty during the last four decades,
Bulgaria did not train staff to plan for guaranteeing national security. Infrastructure,
backing up the probable lines of possible military operations, the choice of equipment,
drilling and training the armed forces—all this was subordinated to goals, tasks, and values
outside the range of Bulgaria's national goals. The dramatically changing situation poses
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difficult questions in either of the listed fields and these fields do not cover the entire
range.
Today, the Republic of Bulgaria stresses its balanced foreign policy,
internationally, in Europe, and particularly in the Balkan region, as a key factor of its
national security. Domestically, the country is seeking to solve the national security
problem within available ways and means. The Government is making every effort to
gradually cut the drastic shortage of means in the military, to organize the police force in
the anti-crime and anti-corruption drive, to establish the new forms of planning and
management of the country's mobilization resources and potentials in line with the
changes.
The Government of the United Democratic Forces that took office after the early
elections on April 19, 1997 is trying to efficiently centralize power, including national
security. Along with that revision, cooperation between the institutions of power in the
field of national security will have to be expanded. Naturally, the National Assembly will
adopt a greater number ofrearmament and reform programs in all armed forces.
Despite the difficulties during the last years, Bulgaria is treading the democratic
path. These years were particularly hard for the national security staff. During these years,
the efforts to guarantee national security were increasingly harmonized, the perspective
became clearer, the difficulties were easier to understand and the way to overcome these
difficulties became more comprehensible. During the last couple of years, Bulgaria gained
reputation as a stabilizing political factor in the Balkans. This is an important prerequisite
for country's national security.
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B. WELFARE AND SECURITY
1. Introduction
Balkan security is critical for guaranteeing an acceptable level of economic
welfare, human freedoms and stable peace for the states in this subregion and for the
whole of Europe. Under the new strategic conditions, security means more than territory
and sovereignty. Economic security and welfare and the protection of civil rights begin to
dominate subregional security. More and more often we also add to the latter the
problems of national and transnational security. These three factors form the foundations
of the stable regional development concept.
The Balkan security is strongly influenced by the general "world order" model.
Regional confrontations forestall or are behind the changes in the global security system.
Economics analyzes the ways to allocate scarce resources between competing
social needs. Defense economics faces the alternatives of welfare and security. When it
calls for defense resources, defense economics considers the arrangement of the priorities
of defense and welfare. Defense resources, excessive and incompatible with reality, not
only set limits to welfare, but they also raise fears in neighbor states. On the other hand,
under allocating resources for defense may improve welfare, but they could create an
illusion that the country is of little importance and that its opponents could act with
impunity. Thus, incompetent and inept management of defense resources can have
significant complications, not only for internal welfare but also for external security.
Defense resource management is more important when economies are reforming and
changing their models for guaranteeing security. In this case, the expected effects from the
changes might be compromised by poorly managed social resources.
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2. NATO enlargement on The Balkan Peninsula
At the summit in Madrid last July, NATO's 16 heads of state and government
invited three states from among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to
start accession talks to join the Alliance. The enlargement of NATO is part of a broad,
long-term strategy that supports the evolution of a peaceful, undivided and democratic
Europe.
a) Benefits ofNATO enlargement
NATO enlargement generates both immediate and long-term benefits, and
they accrue not only to existing and prospective NATO allies but also to states that at
least initially will remain outside the Alliance. Europe is a more secure and stable region
because of NATO's commitment to welcome new members. Facing an opportunity to
become new members ofNATO, part of the Balkan states are reconstructing their foreign
and defense policies to bring them into line with Alliance values and norms. While there
are many reasons for pursuing democratic reform, market development, security
cooperation and other favorable goals, a close analysis of recent events in the region
reveals that the process ofNATO enlargement is exerting a positive influence in moving
states in this region toward democracy. As states are admitted to the Alliance, the United
States and Europe will reap even more substantial benefits:
• Democratic reforms and stability. The dominant pattern in central and
Eastern Europe (CEU) is toward consolidating democratic, market, and security reforms.
Support for NATO and its enlargement has become a unifying point among divergent
political parties in many of these states and has helped to marginalize extreme factors.
Inclusion in the Alliance will place new members within a community of security and
strong political norms that will provide both the structure and incentive to consolidate
their democratic advances.
• Stronger collective defense and ability to address new security
challenges. Collective defense remains imperative for European and transatlantic security.
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The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact eliminated the primary threat that NATO addressed
during the Cold War. However, the war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that
threats remain that affect the Balkan's security. Admitting new states to the Alliance will
create a larger circle of like-minded nations committed to defending each other from these
and other threats and to working together to build a more stable Europe.
• Improved relations among the states on the Balkan Peninsula.
Growing cooperation with NATO and the desire to join the Alliance have provided a
powerful impetus for resolving past disputes among Balkan' states. A series of agreements
among these states and between these states and individual NATO allies were concluded
in recent years, which will help to stabilize borders, promote inter-state cooperation and
address mutual concerns on the treatment of ethnic minorities.
• Burden sharing and contributions to NATO missions. NATO
membership will better enable the new allies to restructure their armed forces so that they
can participate in the full spectrum of current and new Alliance missions, including Article
V missions. Some new members will develop forces for a full range of Alliance missions
and will become net "producers" of security. All will contribute funds to NATO's
common budget. In short, new NATO members will make the same kinds of contributions
to protecting shared US and European interests made by current NATO members.
• Broader European stability. Historically, when the security status ofthe
Balkan Peninsula has been left unclear, the resulting uncertainty has exerted a strong and
dangerously destabilizing influence for the whole of Europe. By fostering stability and
confidence, NATO enlargement will advance the longer-term security interests not only of
these states but also of the United States, Western Europe, CEU, Russia, and others
throughout the region.
• Prosperity. As NATO enlargement helps resolve uncertainties about the
Balkan states' place in an integrated Europe, it will also foster a more stable climate for
economic reform, trade, and investment.
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b) Costs ofpeace and security
Enlargement requires the existing NATO members to extend the most
solemn security guarantees to the new allies. The next paragraphs describe the financial
costs associated with the new security commitments that will be extended to the new
member states.
• Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 requires all members to
treat an attack on one as an attack on all. The enlargement will require the allies to assume
a readiness to assist these states should events require such a response. Indeed, the
credibility of the security guarantees NATO extends to these states will depend on the
demonstrated capacity of the allies to fulfill them.
• NATO enlargement will ultimately enhance Russia's security by fostering
democratic reform and stability in CEU. Even so, a substantial portion of Russia's leaders
oppose enlargement, especially on the Balkans, based on a misperception that it will be
detrimental to Russia's security and position in Europe. The Allies are committed to
forging a long-term strategic partnership with a democratic Russia and to providing ways
for Russia to be a full and constructive participant in Europe's new security system.
• Some observers argue that Balkan states not immediately admitted to
NATO will suffer a sense of isolation and vulnerability, which might undermine
democratic reforms and pro-Western sentiment. NATO, however, has committed itself to
an open-door policy, is enhancing cooperation with all the new democracies through the
Partnership for Peace and is developing the Atlantic Partnership Council to ensure that
enlargement also enhances security for those not initially admitted. The vast majority of
states in the region favor enlargement and see it as contributing to their overall security.
• Some observers also express concern that membership in NATO will
require Balkan states to devote additional resources to their militaries at a time when their
needs are primarily economic and social. While it is certainly true that new member states
will be required to invest in their militaries, improve their capabilities and bear their share
of Alliance responsibilities, NATO membership will also enable them to further downsize
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their forces without diminished security. Thus it is highly questionable whether in the long
term their resulting security costs will be higher than they would have been had NATO not
expanded. Indeed, it is likely that ifNATO did not enlarge, there would be more instability
on Balkans and thus higher security costs for states in the region.
• NATO makes its decisions by consensus among its members. Some
observers have suggested that increasing the Alliance beyond its current 16+3 members
will make it harder to reach internal consensus and make timely and coherent decisions.
While it is true that consensus building could require more effort, this activity should be
viewed in its proper context. Nations within NATO that have differences of view have
both a proven forum and an incentive to resolve problems, whereas bilateral Balkan
disputes can linger for many years.
C. UTILITY FUNCTION OF A COUNTRY
1. National defense and utility function
National defense is a typical case of a public good; if it is provided for a single
member of the society, it is provided for all members of the society. This public good is
provided by the government and is paid by the general revenue system. The price of this
service is not determined in a market; it is difficult to evaluate the economic benefits of
national defense.
Defense spending takes in a substantial share of a country's national output.
Despite the downward trend in the world during the last years, the amount of military
expenditures remains a significant percentage of total output. The levels of defense
spending have a powerful influence on all sectors ofthe society.
The purpose of national defense expenditures is to support a nation in achieving its
national security objectives. These objectives, however, are affected by other nations'
defense expenditures. Changes in the military efforts by both country's allies and
adversaries will result in changes of military expenditures ofthe country.
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2. Utility function of an individual country
We can present a particular country as a utility maximizer, where utility is given by
the function [10]:
Ui = U(Xi,Yi), (2.1)
where: Xi presents the country i's consumption of non-defense goods,
Yi presents the country i's consumption of defense goods.
Country i has a so-called budget constraint expressed as:
Gi = PiXi + Yi, (2.2)
where: Gi denotes country i's Gross National Product (GNP)
Pi is the price ofthe private goods relative to the defense goods.
For more detailed description we can present the utility function of country i as
[10]:
U^iXt-S^Vi-Ti?, (2.3)
where: Si measures subsistence or minimum requirements for non-defense goods
of country i,
Ti measures the minimum defense requirements of country i,
ai and bi represent country i's utility elasticity of non-defense and
defense goods, respectively.
This model doesn't directly measure national security, but the utility function
indirectly indicates the welfare effects of national security. This utility function (2.3)
includes the country's threat perception and indicates how it evaluates defense versus
nondefense goods.
3. Multi-country model
When we consider a multi-country model (defense alliance) we should mention
that each country benefits from its allies' military expenditures. In this case we will
substitute country i's consumption of defense goods Yi with its total consumption of
defense goods Zi [10].
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where: Eij represents the commitment to the defense of country i from country j.
In the relationship between these two countries (i and j) country i perceives that
only a portion ofthe military expenditures Yj ofthe second country is relevant to country
i's defense. Generally, < Eij < 1 .
When Eij = 0, country j's defense expenditures are purely private. Country i
perceives no commitment to its defense efforts from country j. The defense calculations
of the first country don't depend on the assistance from the second country. This situation
corresponds to the case of an individual country from subsection 1.
When Eij =1, country j's defense expenditures are purely public, i.e., they are
completely devoted to the alliance.
In a real situation, when < Eij < 1 , the utility function of country i is presented
as follows:
tf,=(^-s,m-7;)\ (2.5)
In the common case the total consumption of defense goods Zi is bigger than the
consumption of defense goods Yi . Assuming this and comparing formulas (2.3) and (2.5)
our first conclusion is that the utility function of country i increases if it is included in an
alliance with its current adversaries.
D. GNP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES
1. GNP and population growth
a) GNP ofthe countries
GNP for different countries is a useful measure for the so-called budget
constraints. However, a methodological problem arises when attempting to convert the
GNP of several different countries into a single currency. The problem is that a significant
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part of GNP is made up of nontraded goods and services, that is, goods that do not and
often cannot enter into international trade. Gross national product converted to dollars by
exchange rates that are determined by the flow of traded goods alone will give misleading
comparisons if the ratio of prices of nontraded goods to the prices of traded goods is
different in the countries being compared. To avoid this problem, we will use the exchange
rate that is calculated by comparing the prices in two countries of nontraded as well as
traded goods; this is called the purchasing power parity (PPP).
For the purpose of the analysis in Chapter 3, Table 2.1 (Appendix A) and
Figure 2.1 present GNP data for a number of Balkan countries [12]. The scope of this
presentation will be limited to Bulgaria and its neighbors. Only Macedonia is not
presented, because of its relative insignificance in terms of population, GNP, and armed
forces.
According to the changes in GNP during the period 1985—1995 we can
divide the countries into three groups. The first group, Greece and Turkey, show
uninterrupted increase in GNP during the last 1 1 years. The second group, Bulgaria and
Romania, have a substantial drop in GNP between 1989 and 1993, and relative
stabilization after 1993. The deterioration of the economic performance of these countries
in the early 1990's is connected with the dissolution of the former East European
economic organization COMECOM. The third group is presented by only one country,
Yugoslavia, whose unusual drop of GNP in 1991 and 1992 is a consequence of the civil
war and disintegration of the country.
b) Population ofthe countries
The Population of Bulgaria and most of its neighbors between 1985 and
1995 is presented in Table 2.2 (Appendix A) and in Figure 2.2. The population ofBulgaria
and Romania is decreasing at a very slow pace, the population of Greece is increasing
somewhat, and there is a big drop in the population of disintegrated Yugoslavia. The only
country that has a substantial natural increase in population is Turkey.
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GNP by country in constant bil $ 1995
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Bulgaria •Greece —*— Romania x Turkey —*— Yugoslavia
Figure 2.1. Gross National Product by country
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Figure 2.2. Population by country
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c) GNPper capita ofthe Balkan countries
It is useful to present not only the GNP of the Balkan countries, but also
their GNP per capita. These data can be seen in Table 2.3 (Appendix A) and in Figure 2.3.
Greece has the highest and Turkey has the lowest GNP per capita, but both of them show
a steady increase of this parameter between 1985 and 1995. In the beginning of the period,
Bulgaria and Romania had relatively high figures, a substantial drop after the collapse of
COMECOM, and relative stabilization or slight increase at the end of the period.
Yugoslavia's data again reflects their grave crisis—the consequence of civil war and
disintegration.
2. Military expenditures
a) Military expenditures ofthe countries
The Balkan countries' military expenditures [12] in billions of constant
1995 dollars are presented in Table 2.4 (Appendix A) and Figure 2.4. The downward
trend in military spending of Bulgaria and Romania (the most militarized Balkan countries
in the 1980's) starts in 1987 and continues until 1993. After this year we see some
increase in their military spending. Data for Yugoslavia are not complete. Greek military
spending is relatively stable, while the military expenditures of Turkey show steady
growth.
b) Military expenditures as a percent ofGNP
Table 2.5 (Appendix A) and Figure 2.5 show military expenditures as a
percent of GNP for Bulgaria and its neighbors between 1985 and 1995. The percent of
military expenditures in Turkey is almost constant during these years (around 4%), while
the Greek percentage shows some decline (from 7% in 1985 to 5.5% in 1995). In 1995,
however, both countries spend a much higher percentage of GNP for military resources
than the average for world (2.8%) or the average for NATO (3.0%). One ofthe reasons
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Figure 2.3. Gross National Product per capita
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Figure 2.4. Military expenditures by country
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for these countries' substantial military expenditures is the hostility between them, which
has deep historical roots.
In 1985, Romania's military spending as a percent of GNP is equal to that
of Greece; after a decrease in this index in 1995, it has the smallest ratio among the five
countries. After years of considerable military efforts (more than 14% of its GNP), in the
1990's Bulgaria's ratio decreased dramatically; in 1995 its military expenditures relative to
GNP (2.8%) equaled the average for the world.
c) Military expendituresper capita
It is interesting to see military expenditures of the Balkan countries per
capita. The results are presented in Table 2.6 (in Appendix A) and in Figure 2.6. The
picture shows almost constant expenditures for Turkey and Greece, but the Turkey's
military spending per capita is below the world's average (approximately $152 in 1995),
while Greek expenditures are more than three times higher. In the 1980's Bulgaria and
Romania were in first and third positions on the Balkan Peninsula according to their
military spending per capita; in 1995 their expenditures equaled those of Turkey and were
below the world average.
3. Armed forces of the Balkan countries
a) Armedforces by country
The downward trend of the world and NATO armed forces between 1985
and 1995 doesn't significantly affect the data for the Balkan countries [12]. The only
country in this sub-region that substantially decreased the number of soldiers is Bulgaria.
The data are presented in Table 2.7 (Appendix A) and in Figure 2.7. Romania and Turkey
maintain almost the same number of soldiers during these years, while Greece increased its
military strength.
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Military Expenditures per GNP in %
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Bulgaria —a— Greece —a— Romania —x— Turkey —*— Yugoslavia
Figure 2.5. Military expenditures per GNP by country
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Figure 2.6. Military expenditures per capita
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It is interesting to note that the number of Turkish soldiers is four times
higher than the number of soldiers from its NATO ally Greece, and still higher than the
cumulative number of soldiers from Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania.
b) Armedforces per 1, 000people
Data presented in Table 2.8 (Appendix A) and in Figure 2.8 show a
somewhat different picture. When we examine the number of soldiers per 1,000 people,
the leader among Bulgaria's neighbors is Greece, which ranks first with a stable index of
20. In contrast, the average for world in 1995 was 4 and the average for NATO was 6.7.
Bulgaria had the highest ratio in the region with 21 soldiers per 1,000 people in mid 80's;
in 1995 Bulgaria had an index of 10. A similar downward trend characterizes the indices
of Romania and Turkey. Nevertheless, the Balkan Peninsula remains a highly militarized
region ofEurope and the World.
4. Arms transfers
a) Arms imports
The data for arms imports are presented in Table 2.9 (Appendix A) and in
Figure 2.9. The world arms trade declined generally during the last ten years, but this
tendency is not shown clearly on the Balkan Peninsula [12]. After being the biggest
importer of arms in mid 80' s, Bulgaria had no imports at the end of the period. The same
situation holds for Romania. During the same period, the arms imports in Greece and
Turkey were relatively constant. This level is much more a characteristic of the Cold War
years than the end ofthe Twentieth century.
b) Arms exports
Table 2.10 (Appendix A) and Figure 2.10 show the data for arms exports
in millions of constant 1995 dollars during the same 11 -year period. Greece and Turkey
have never been big arms exporters and they maintained low exports during these years.
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Figure 2.9. Arms imports by country
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Figure 2. 10. Arms exports by country
45
On the other hand, the biggest exporter of arms in mid 80's on the Balkan Peninsula,
Bulgaria shows a steady downward trend. It is valid also for the second and third biggest
exporters—Yugoslavia and Romania. Despite this trend in 90' s, Bulgaria remains the
number one arms exporter among the Balkan countries.
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m. SIMULATION OF THE MODEL FOR COMMON SECURITY
A. A MODEL OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON THE BALKANS
1. NATO and the countries on the Balkan Peninsula
To address the issues raised in the previous chapters, it is useful to create a
mathematical model which depicts the benefits and costs of including more Balkan states
in the system for common security. This system reflects one possible future scenario for
NATO enlargement on the Balkan Peninsula. The benefits and costs will be evaluated in
terms ofLevel of security and Social Welfare ofthe Balkan states.
Figure 3.1 shows the ten Balkan Peninsula countries: Albania (AL), Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BH), Bulgaria (BU), Croatia (CR), Greece (GR), Macedonia (MA),
Romania (RO), Slovenia (SL), Turkey (TU), and Yugoslavia (YU).
CR SL
i k
AL <— NATO GR — RTT
(Balkan
BH <— Peninsula) TU — RO
^ r u
MA YU
Figure 3.1. Countries on the Balkan Peninsula
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Two of these countries (Greece and Turkey) are members ofNATO; most of the
remaining countries want to join them in the Alliance. Among the all of the candidates,
Romania and Bulgaria have the best chances to join NATO during the next five years. We
expect all of the countries to benefit from future NATO enlargement. The level of benefit,
however, will vary among different countries and depend on the level of security provided
by the new system for common security on The Balkans.
2. Different Scenarios of integration
There are six different scenarios for Bulgaria's integration in the existing system
for common security—NATO. Despite the well-known animosity between the NATO
representatives from the Balkans, it is convenient to consider Greece and Turkey as an
integral part of the Alliance presenting its assets in this sub-region. For Bulgaria,
concluding an agreement with NATO equates to making an alliance with the local
representatives of this organization. Examining the potential gains from cooperation, we
can consider six scenarios for integration:
a) Bulgaria and Greece
In this case we consider a situation where Bulgaria's neighbor, Greece,
separates from its current condition, membership in NATO, and forms an alliance with
Bulgaria. This situation is improbable, but we can use the results for comparison purposes.
b) Bulgaria and Turkey
This case is similar to situation (a). There is also very low probability that




In this case we will examine the situation in which Bulgaria is the only new
member of NATO, among the all aspirants. The data for the whole NATO organization
will be substituted by the data for its representatives on the Balkans: Greece and Turkey.
d) Bulgaria and (NATO and Romania)
In this scenario we assume that Romania is the first country from the
Balkans that becomes a member of NATO. After integrating Romania in the Alliance,
Bulgaria has the opportunity to join the new Alliance, already including three Balkan
countries: Greece, Romania, and Turkey.
e) Bulgaria and Romania andNATO
In this scenario, Bulgaria and Romania simultaneously become members of
the Alliance.
f) (Bulgaria and Romania) andNATO
In this situation, Bulgaria and Romania form a bilateral military alliance
before joining NATO. The probability for this scenario is very low because it means that
these countries would revitalize their military cooperation from the dissolved Warsaw
Pact.
Considering the political situation on the Balkans and in Europe as a whole
(presented in the previous sections), the most probable scenarios for Bulgaria's integration





B. ISOLATION CASE VERSUS NASH CASE
1. Isolation case
In Chapter n, section C we defined the utility function and budget constraints of




This country has no allies, its military expenditure provide purely private goods,
and it doesn't benefit from any other country's defense expenditures. Having this type of
utility function and budget constraint, it is easy to derive an expression for country i's
isolation defense expenditures:
Y Ji {Gi -SiPi ) + aiTi
ai+ bi
The expression for this country's non-defense goods will be:
^,(G,-7;)+w>
In formulas (3.3) and (3.4), military and non-defense expenditures depend on
different variables and constants. It is the same for the utility function in (3.1). Changing
the value of some of these variables we can calculate different values for utility and
defense expenditures of the country and make observations.
2. Nash case
In order to calculate the defense expenditures of country i , which joins a defense
alliance, we will use a different expression for the utility function [10]:
UMXi-SWt-ttf (3.4)
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Section C, country i's total consumption of defense
goods Zi is:
^^+IV/ = ^ +z-. (3 - 5)
We will assume two situations: the first involves a defense alliance including two
allies; the second involves a defense alliance consisting of three allies.
a) Defense alliance with two allies
In this case, the Nash defense expenditure reaction function is given by:
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where: r, = '— < 1
In equation (3.6), Yi represents country i's isolation defense expenditures
and yi is the slope of the reaction function. Nash equilibrium occurs when the reaction
curves of the two members of the alliance intersect. The intersection is the point where
country i's expectations regarding the country j's contribution are consistent with the
second country's actual contribution, and vise versa [10].
For an alliance involving two countries, simultaneously solving both
countries' reaction functions yields the following expression for Nash equilibrium defense
expenditures [10]:
„„
b, («, + b, XG, -S,P,)- afifi, (G, -S£ ) + a, (a, + b, )T, -ap^T,
Considering that countries i and j have GNP's and threat perceptions that
change during the time, it is possible to derive the trend for the military expenditures and
for the nations' utility level.
b) Defense alliance with three allies
With a defense alliance consisting of three allies, we can write the
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U2 =U2(X2 ,Z2 ) = (X2 -S2 ) a>(Z2 -T2 )b> (3.9)














G2 =P2X2 +Y2 (3.12)
G3 =P,X2 +YZ (3.13)
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Z2 =Y2 +E2lYl +E23Y3 (3.15)
Z3 = 73 +E3lY, +E32Y2 (3.16)
If we substitute equations (3.8) to (3.16) into equation (3.6) we will find
expressions for the three countries' Nash expenditure reaction functions are:
vN
-Y -c F YN -c F YN
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C2*L23 is a matrix of their interdependencies.
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Our task is to find the countries' Nash defense expenditures Y? . It is easy
to solve this problem by transforming equation (3.23) as follows:
YN =/m>(A)Y (3.24)
When we compare the defense expenditures for both cases, isolation and
alliance, from equations (3.7) and (3.17) we hypothesize that country i reduces its
military expenditures in the alliance case. Simultaneously, our hypothetical country
increases its non-defense expenditures and its utility level. These adjustments are
responses to the perceived value of the allied defense inflow, Z-i. These results depend on
the relative utility elasticities of the defense and non-defense goods, ai and bi . As a
result, country i reduces its military expenditures by a smaller amount than the increase in
the perceived allied contribution (the actual response depends on coefficient yi). In this
way, according to equation (3.5), country i's total defense consumption increases. Since
this increase is accompanied with an increase of the non-defense expenditures, the utility
of country i increases also.
C. SCENARIOS WITH TWO ALLIES
To illustrate the above considerations, we will show some numerical results. For
this purpose we will use a stylized representation of the Balkan Peninsula. We will assume
that all of the countries are identical in their structure—coefficients ai, bi, and Pi. Of
course, these countries are different in size, population, economic performance, and threat
perception. We assume also that all of the countries on the Balkan Peninsula have the
same relative minimum non-defense consumption requirements (i.e., Si=25% of GNP).
1. Bulgaria and Greece
The parameters of these two countries are shown in Table 3.1. Data for Bulgaria's
and Greece's GNP (Gi) are from Table 2.1 (Appendix A). They are given in billions of
constant 1995 dollars. These data are averaged over the last eleven years (from 1985 to
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1995). The perceived commitment Eij reflects the countries' relative geographic size and
population.
Country Gi ai bi Pi Si Ti Eij
Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 1.6 0.75
Greece 80 0.7 0.2 3 20 0.7 1
Table 3.1. Illustrative countries' parameters
Using the parameters from Table 3.1 and equations (3.1), (3.3), (3.4), and (3.6) we
can calculate the defense expenditures (Y) and utility functions (U) of Bulgaria and
Greece for both the isolation and alliance cases, assuming a Nash equilibrium. Table 3.2
shows the results of these calculations and also the percentage of change of the defense
expenditures and utility function for each of the countries after forming an alliance.
Numerical results for Bulgaria's and Greece's defense expenditures in the isolation
case in billions of constant 1995 dollars reflect the real situation with this level of threat
perception. Comparing the data for defense expenditures from Table 3.2, shows that the
estimated values are similar to the average defense expenditures for the both countries
during the last eleven years (from Table 2.1, Appendix A).
Country Y Y(N) X u Y/G Y(N)/G %AY %AU
Bulgaria Isolation 4.02 15.33 2.47 0.08
Nash IIS '&. H 49% 21%
Greece Isolation 4.99 25.00 4.13 0.06
Nash 25.53; HI 3111 mm
Table 3.2. Illustrative isolation and Nash results
Table 3.2 shows that Bulgaria, despite its smaller size, bears a relatively heavy
military burden in the isolation case. Bulgaria's higher relative defense expenditures reflect
54
its higher perceived threat. Table 3.2 shows also how the basic parameters for the both
countries are changing after a concluding a bilateral alliance. A direct consequence of this
alliance is a substantial drop in their military burden and increase in their utility level.
2. Bulgaria and Turkey
A Bulgaria/Turkey alliance would have similar results to those described in
Subsection 1. Parameters for both countries are shown in Table 3.3. GNP data are also
from Table 2.1 (Appendix A). In this case, the threat perception is different and the
perceived commitment from Bulgaria's point of view is much smaller compared to the
previous case. It reflects the huge difference in size and population between Bulgaria and
Turkey.
Country Gi ai bi Pi Si Ti Eij
Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 1.6 0.15
Turkey 140 0.7 0.2 3 35 1 1
Table 3.3. Illustrative countries' parameters
Nevertheless, numerical results from Table 3.4 show a drop in the military
expenditures of both countries, and an increase of their utility level after concluding a
bilateral agreement.
Country Y Y(N) X U Y/G Y(N)/G %AY %AU
Bulgaria Isolation 4.02 15.33 2.47 0.08
Nash •333; 15.56 2M III 17% 11
Turkey Isolation 8.56 43.81 6.88 0.06
Nash PM 44.68 0.04 III s
Table 3.4. Illustrative isolation and Nash results
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3. Bulgaria and NATO
In this scenario, Bulgaria is included in an alliance with Greece and Turkey—the
NATO representatives on the Balkan Peninsula (NATO-BP). This situation is similar to
that described in the previous two subsections. Parameters for both sides are shown in
Table 3.5. Data for GNP are from Table 2.1 (Appendix A). The threat perception of the
existing alliance (NATO-BP) is different. The perceived commitment from Bulgaria's
point of view also reflects the substantial difference in size and population between
Bulgaria and NATO-BP.
Country Gi ai bi Pi Si Ti Eij
Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 1.6 0.12
NATO-BP 220 0.7 0.2 3 55 0.4 1
Table 3.5. Illustrative countries' parameters
Table 3.6 shows the results of including Bulgaria in an alliance with the part of
NATO situated on the Balkan Peninsula. This alliance, as in the previous cases, is
accompanied with a considerable drop in the military expenditures of all members and
increases in their utility levels.
Country Y Y(N) X u Y/G Y(N)/G %AY %AU
Bulgaria Isolation 4.02 15.33 2.47 0.08
Nash in i5J$4 Hi HIS 241 mm
NATO-
BP
Isolation 12.53 69.16 10.53 0.06
Nash ill sip im in Hi mm
Table 3.6. Illustrative isolation and Nash results
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4. Bulgaria and (NATO + Romania)
This scenario illustrates the situation where Bulgaria is included in NATO's
alliance on the Balkan Peninsula, but Romania has already been admitted as a member of
NATO. The situation is somewhat difficult to assess, because some data in Table 3.5
would change as Romania is admitted to NATO. Bulgaria's threat perception should
increase when the status quo on the Balkan Peninsula changes. An alliance between the
countries surrounding Bulgaria from North and South inevitably would increase fears
among Bulgarian politicians and its population.
Illustrative parameters for both sides in the new situation are shown in Table 3.7.
Data for GNP, as in the previous cases, are from Table 2. 1 (Appendix A). The perceived
commitment from Bulgaria's point of view reflects the significant difference in size and
population between Bulgaria and the new alliance
—
(NATO-BP + Romania).
Country Gi ai bi Pi Si Ti Eij
Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 2 0.09
NATO+RO 335 0.7 0.2 3 83.75 0.4 1
Table 3.7. Illustrative countries' parameters
Table 3.8 shows the results of forming an alliance between Bulgaria and a NATO
organization on the Balkans, which includes the current members of the Alliance plus
Country Y Y(N) X U Y/G Y(N)/G %AY %AU
Bulgaria Isolation 4.33 15.22 2.39 0.09
Nash IIS 111 0.06 llil HH
NATO +
Romania
Isolation 18.92 105.4 15.41 0.06
Nash m 106:2 15.94 §M 13 :% §1
Table 3.8. Illustrative isolation and Nash results
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Romania. Partly due to Bulgaria's increased threat perception in the isolation case, this
alliance is accompanied by a considerable drop in the military expenditures of both sides,
and an increase in their utility levels.
D. THREE ALLIES SCENARIO
In this scenario, Bulgaria and Romania simultaneously conclude an alliance
agreement with the NATO representatives on the Balkan Peninsula—Greece and Turkey.
The parameters of all three members in this alliance are shown in Table 3.9. Data for GNP
are from Table 2.1 (Appendix A). The perceived commitment from Bulgaria's and
Romania's points of view reflect the difference in size and population between Bulgaria
and Romania, between Bulgaria and NATO-BP, and between Romania and NATO-BP.
Country Gi ai bi Pi Si Ti Eij Eij
Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 1.6 0.4 0.12
Romania 115 0.7 0.2 3 28.75 0.5 1 0.3
NATO-BP 220 0.7 0.2 3 55 0.4 1 1
Table 3.9. Illustrative countries' parameters
The method of solving the three allies' scenario is presented in Appendix B. The
results of this trilateral alliance are shown in Table 3.10. Looking at the data we can
conclude that the change in the external political orientation of the three sides generates a
considerable drop in their military expenditures and increases their utility. Among the three
sides of the new alliance, Romania has the largest decline in its military expenditures—55
%; Bulgaria has the largest increase in its utility level—18 %. NATO-BP's has a smaller
but still substantial decline in military expenditures and increase in utility.
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Country Y Y(N) X U Y/G Y(N)/G %AY %AU
Bulgaria Isolation 4.02 15.33 2.47 0.08
Nash 2.30 1511 2,92 0.05 Ml Hi
Romania Isolation 6.78 36.07 5.82 0.06
Nash HH 6 r69 111 111
NATO-
BP
Isolation 12.53 69.16 10.53 0.06
Nash 8,20 m UM III Hi HI
Table 3.10. Illustrative isolation and Nash results
E. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FOR BULGARIA
As we saw in the previous section, all of the countries benefit from extending
Balkans alliance. It doesn't depend on how many and which countries are included in this
future system for collective security. All of the countries have an opportunity to decrease
their military expenditures, to increase the consumption of non-defense goods, and
consequently to increase their utility levels.
However, it is interesting to compare the potential gains for Bulgaria to its allies in
one possible future defense alliance on the Balkan Peninsula. For this purpose, we will use
the most probable alliance scenario—scenario (c) from section A, Chapter HI. This
scenario depicts NATO enlargement on the Balkans as including Bulgaria in this European
sub-region. NATO's current Balkan members include Greece and Turkey.
The evaluation of Bulgaria's relative benefit with respect to its possible future
allies will be conducted as follows:
1. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable GNP
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.11 (Appendix C) show the difference in military
expenditures as percent ofGNP (ME/GNP) between Bulgaria and NATO-BP for the Nash
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alliance case. The figure also shows the cross-country differences in the percentage change
in military expenditures (Y) and utility levels (U) between the Nash and isolation cases.
When one of these three measures is higher than zero, it indicates a lower benefit for the
second side ofthe alliance—the current NATO members Greece and Turkey.
The variable—NATO countries' GNP—varies from 180 to 250 billion constant
1995 dollars.
Figure 3.2 shows, that despite the change of NATO-BP's GNP, the difference in
utility levels favors Bulgaria. This is valid for the whole range and the difference increases
with increases in NATO-BP's GNP. In the first third of the range, the difference in
percentage change in military expenditures for the both sides favors NATO-BP; when
NATO-BP's GNP exceeds $204 billion, the relative change in military expenditures favors
Bulgaria. The difference in military expenditures per GNP always favors NATO-BP.
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.12 (Appendix C) show the same measures as Figure 1, but
this time Bulgaria's GNP varies. The cross-country differences in the percentage change in
utility levels favors Bulgaria; it becomes zero when Bulgaria's GNP exceeds $ 65 billion.
The same pattern hold for the cross-country differences in the percentage change in
military expenditures between the Nash and isolation cases. This parameter favors
Bulgaria until its GNP becomes $ 56 billion. Beyond this level, the parameter favors
NATO-BP. Regardless the change of Bulgaria's GNP, the difference in military
expenditures as percent ofGNP favors NATO-BP, as in the previous case.
2. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable threat perception
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.13 (Appendix C) present the same measures as above, but
this time the threat perception varies for the NATO Balkan countries. The graphs show
that the cross-country differences in the percentage change in military expenditures and
utility levels between the isolation and Nash cases always favors Bulgaria; these
differences increase as the NATO-BP's threat perception increases.
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The difference between the military expenditures as percent of GNP for the both sides
after concluding an alliance favors NATO-BP. However, as their threat perception
increases, this difference decreases; Bulgaria's decrease in military expenditures tends to
equal the decrease in military expenditures of the NATO countries on the Balkan
Peninsula.
3. Bulgaria's relative benefits with variable E12
The theoretical model in Chapter HI assumed that Bulgaria's perceived
commitment from its allies is proportional to the ratio between the geographical sizes and
populations of both allies. Since the density of the population in all of the countries in this
sub-region is similar, it is possible to present the perceived commitment as function of the
geographical sizes of the countries. It is interesting to see what happens with the three
measures of Bulgaria's relative benefit when E12 varies and doesn't reflect relative size.
The results are presented in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.14 (Appendix C).
The cross-country difference in the percentage change in utility levels as E12 varies
from 0.08 to 0.2 is positive for Bulgaria; it increases as the perceived commitment
increases. The cross-country difference in the percentage change in military expenditures
also increases with E12; this difference favors Bulgaria when the perceived commitment is
at least 0.1. The difference in military expenditures between Bulgaria and NATO-BP
favors NATO-BP until it becomes zero (equal military expenditure reductions for the both
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. The only possible choice
In the post Cold war era, after the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and COMECOM,
Bulgaria feels insecure. The reason for this insecurity is a combination of geostrategic and
domestic factors. External factors include Bulgaria's position within the traditionally
volatile Balkan region, which is marked by long-standing disputes and bitter rivalries.
Internally the country is undergoing a simultaneous transition of both its economic and
political systems, with the goal of integrating into Western political, military, and
economic structures.
There are three possible solutions for Bulgaria's national security problems:
creating a Bulgarian neutrality system; integrating the country in the emerging European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); and including Bulgaria in NATO. Assuming the
obstacles for creating a viable neutrality status in this European region and the
impossibility ofwaiting to establish ESDI, the only possible alternative for guaranteeing of
Bulgaria's national security is joining NATO.
Bulgaria's decision for full membership in the Euro-Atlantic structure has its
political, military-strategic, financial-economic, and social and legal consequences. Most
of these consequences are favorable for the country and they fully offset the negative
implications of this decision.
2. Bulgaria and its neighbors
During the last few years, the situation on the Balkan Peninsula has become more
complicated. With the implementation of the Cascade Plan under the CFE Treaty, the
existing balance of the armed forces in this part of Europe changed. The imbalance in the
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armed forces of Bulgaria vis a vis its neighbors constitutes a direct risk to the security of
the country. Considering the history of the Balkans and the ongoing problems in
Yugoslavia, despite the economic crisis, Bulgaria makes a disproportionate unilateral
investment relative to other countries in the region to maintain a military budget to
guarantee a subsistence level of security.
3. Alliances and benefits
After concluding an alliance with its former adversaries, as a result of the
perceived value of allied defense inflows, the defense expenditures of the newly allied
countries decrease. This drop depends on the level of commitment between the alliance
and the new ally and relative economic performance. As the allies' military expenditures
decrease, they have an opportunity to increase their non-defense goods. This increases
their utility levels.
Table 4.1 presents the changes in Bulgaria's consumption of non-defense goods
(X), defense goods (Y), and utility (U) as a result of joining an alliance in five different
scenarios (Chapter EH, A, 2). Military expenditures as a percent ofGNP (Y/G), the decline
in defense expenditures (% AY), and the increase of utility (% AU) are presented as well.
Bulgaria X Y U Y/G %AY %AU
Basic case 15.33 4.02 2.47 8.0 % — —
Scenario a) 15.99 2.04 2.99 4.1 % 49% 21%
Scenario b) 15.56 3.33 2.65 6.7 % 17% 7%
Scenario c) 15.64 3.08 2.72 6.2 % 24% 10%
Scenario d)* 15.61 3.18 2.69 6.4 % 27% 13%
Scenario e) 15.90 2.30 2.92 4.6 % 43% 18%
Table 4.1. Illustrative results for Bulgaria at different scenarios
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d)*—It is difficult to use the results from this scenario for comparisons because NATO-
BP is presented not only by its current members, but also by a third member—Romania.
Independent of the scenario, when Bulgaria enters a political-military alliance with
its neighbors, it always improves the country's welfare indicators compared to the basic
(isolation) case. Despite the impossibility of some integration scenarios, they still illustrate
the consistency of outcome from this decision. More specifically, the two most realistic
scenarios: (c)—including of Bulgaria as part of NATO's Balkan membership; and (e)
—
simultaneously including Bulgaria and Romania in NATO-BP, provide favorable results
for Bulgaria.
It is interesting to ask if the current NATO Balkan Peninsula members (Greece and
Turkey) benefit from these alliances. Table 4.2 shows that in scenarios (c) and (e), NATO-
BP has a substantial decrease in its military expenditures and a modest increase in utility.
NATO-BP X Y U Y/G %AY %AU
Basic case 69.16 12.53 10.53 5.7 % ~ ~
Scenario c) 69.95 10.14 11.06 4.6 % 19% 5%
Scenario e) 70.60 8.20 11.49 3.7% 34% 9%
Table 4.2. Illustrative results for NATO-BP at different scenarios
The results for NATO-BP are better when it forms an alliance with a bigger ally
(Bulgaria and Romania simultaneously). The new allies jointly commit more military
expenditures to the alliance compared to scenario (c), when only one country (Bulgaria)
joins NATO.
4. Bulgaria's relative benefits
Evaluating the difference in military expenditures as percent of GNP between
Bulgaria and NATO-BP for the alliance case (c) and the cross-country differences in the
percentage change in military expenditures and utility levels between the alliance and
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isolation case, we see that Bulgaria's relative benefits are somewhat higher compared to
its future allies. This is a consequence mainly of Bulgaria's disproportionately large
military expenditures in the isolation case and its small relative GNP.
B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
1. GNP of the countries
Calculating the benefits for the countries situated on the Balkans after joining in a
system for common security required data for their budget constraints. GNP is presented
as a measure of these budget constraints in the thesis, using Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) to convert to a common currency. Unfortunately this measure doesn't present the
real value of Bulgaria's GNP. When we add the so-called "economy in shadow"
(according to some estimations approximately 35% of GNP) we see that some results are
not reliable.
This thesis also assumed that all of the countries are identical in their structure: the
elasticity of non-defense and defense goods; the price of private goods relative to defense
goods; and the relative minimum non-defense consumption requirements. Of course this
equality is unrealistic. Using different values for all countries we will modify the results.
However, the new results will not change the logic of improvements after concluding an
alliance between former adversaries.
2. Perceived threat
To calculate country i's utility function (equation 2.5), it was necessary to know
its minimum total defense requirements, or the threat perception of this country. This
threat perception is connected with: the size of the neighbor (former adversary and future
ally); its budget and military spending; the history of destructive wars and invasions;
existence of national minorities in the country; the type of government (democratic or
totalitarian).
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If there were only two states or groups of states, it would be relatively easy to
define some data for threat perceptions across states. However, there are many countries
on the Balkan Peninsula and all of them have at least four neighbors. Some of the
countries mentioned in the analysis, like Turkey or Romania, have neighbors who are
situated outside the Balkans. It is very difficult to assess what part of the military
expenditures of a particular country are directed against potential adversaries on the
Balkan Peninsula.
A further complication is introduced by the tensions between the current NATO
members on the Balkans, Greece and Turkey. In this thesis, however, it is impossible to
evaluate the impact ofthese tensions on the military expenditures ofthese two countries.
3. Commitment from the allies
The commitment between allies in this analysis reflects the ratio between their sizes
and populations. In the scenario when Bulgaria joins NATO-BP, the population and size
of NATO's Balkan members (Greece and Turkey) is eight times bigger than the
population and size of Bulgaria. If Bulgaria's perceived commitment from its NATO-BP
allies is different than 0.12, the benefit ofthe alliance will change dramatically (Figure 3.5).
4. Assessing the advantages
This thesis presents results concerning military cooperation of different countries
on the Balkans. For all countries, and especially for Bulgaria, benefits are connected with
decreasing military expenditures, increasing consumption of non-defense goods, and
increasing utility levels. However, it is very difficult to assess all of the consequences for
Bulgaria from integration in NATO. How exactly this will reflect on the stability of the
region, to what extend this will promote Bulgaria's membership in the European Union,
and how this will affect foreign investments in the country, are all unanswered questions.
In addition, it is impossible to estimate how the geopolitical location of Bulgaria
will influence the flow ofgoods through the country and how this will affect the GNP. We
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may make only assumptions about how increasing the output of Bulgaria's defense
industry, that has the highest potential on the Balkans, will affect the country's economy.
5. Evaluation of expenditures for joining NATO
In Chapter I, the costs ofNATO enlargement for Bulgaria are estimated at $300-
400 million over the first ten years. This sum is calculated in analogy with the case of the
first three invitees from Eastern Europe. Similarly to the countries included in the initial
NATO enlargement, Bulgaria will pay just a portion of this sum—approximately $100
million.
Comparing this expenditure with the benefits of including ofBulgaria in the system
for common security (decreasing the military expenditures by $1 billion annually) we see
that the benefits (cost savings) are much higher than the costs. The problem is that we
have not estimated the actual expenditures for joining NATO; this comparison may be
inaccurate.
C. RECOMENDATIONS
1. National security at lower cost
The long-term prospects for reform in Bulgaria rely on the West's recognition that
isolating Bulgaria and the Balkan region from the Euro-Atlantic structures is inherently
destabilizing for European security. The Continent will be integrated when all walls come
down, whether political, economic, or military.
Every country has armed forces as an element of national security, but security
cannot be ensured by military might alone. Indeed, excessive investment in military power
can lead to economic disaster. It is in everyone's interest to reduce tension and to reduce
the perceived need for a nation to spend money on military resources. A system for
common security, like NATO, can reduce defense expenditures among its member states.
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By combining efforts in the Alliance, the Balkan countries can maintain their
sovereignty and military systems, but at lower level of strength, and assure their national
security at lower cost.
2. Broader enlargement of the Alliance
Most of the Balkan states formed the borderline between the former Warsaw Pact
and NATO. The material consequences of this still weighs heavily on their armed forces
and taxpayers. Bulgaria now enjoys good neighborly relations with all countries in the
region. Ifwe are partners and allies with them today, sharing the same vision of the future,
tomorrow we shall be allies in the full sense of the term. Future NATO enlargement on the
Balkans should include as many states as possible. Extending the Euro-Atlantic structures
to Bulgaria and Romania, and in the future to the rest of the Balkan countries, will
substantially decrease military spending in all of the countries and simultaneously enhance
their security.
3. Economic cooperation
There is nothing more urgently needed than a real effort to build stability through
cooperation in Southeastern Europe. This will determine the future of the Balkans. There
is a growing recognition among the countries in the region that they need to coordinate
their efforts to ensure long-term stabilization and economic dynamism. Economic
reconstruction and reintegration into the world economy enhance stability; stability breeds
dynamic economic growth and business opportunities. Bulgaria and its neighbors have to
be ready to provide their own contributions for this purpose.
The Balkan Peninsula's stability and security are of crucial importance for Europe
and, indeed, the world. This is not overstating the obvious but is a real interpretation of
the situation. If the Euro-Atlantic community is genuinely determined to contain future
conflicts on religious or ethnic grounds, this is the region and the time where we could
both prove and test this commitment. Accomplishing this historic mission is Bulgaria's
mission for the future ofthe Balkans.
71
72
APPENDIX A. GNP, ARMED FORCES, AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1985
bill $ 1995
56.5 76.1 136.1 106.4 138.1
1986 58.0 77.0 138.2 116.0 140.2
1987 58.1 76.8 135.4 128.1 122.8
1988 59.9 80.5 140.3 131.6 138.4
1989 59.4 83.0 135.8 130.3 135.1
1990 52.0 82.5 120.6 142.3 121.4
1991 40.8 85.6 104.1 144.5 102.6
1992 39.7 86.4 88.2 152.5 14.5
1993 37.7 87.5 89.8 164.6 15.0
1994 37.8 88.8 93.4 156.8 17.0
1995 37.7 91.2 98.9 166.7 20.6
Table 2.1. Gross National Product by country
Year Population by country in millions
1: Bulgaria :', . KomaisVv Yugoslavia
1985 8.9 9.9 22.5 50.7 23.1
1986 9.0 10.0 22.5 51.8 23.3
1987 9.0 10.0 22.6 52.9 23.4
1988 9.0 10.0 22.7 54.0 23.6
1989 9.0 10.0 22.8 55.1 23.7
1990 9.0 10.1 22.8 56.1 23.8
1991 8.9 10.3 22.7 57.2 23.9
1992 8.9 10.3 22.7 58.3 10.5
1993 8.5 10.4 22.4 59.3 10.5
1994 8.5 10.4 22.2 60.4 10.5
1995 8.6 10.5 21.9 61.4 10.6
Table 2.2. Population by country
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Year GNP per capita in constant thousand $ 1995
Bulgaria Greece: Romania v Turkey- Yugoslavia ;
1985 6.3 7.7 6.1 2.1 6.0
1986 6.5 7.7 6.1 2.2 6.0
1987 6.5 7.7 6.0 2.4 5.2
1988 6.7 8.0 6.2 2.4 5.9
1989 6.6 8.3 6.0 2.4 5.7
1990 5.8 8.1 5.3 2.5 5.1
1991 4.6 8.3 4.6 2.5 4.3
1992 4.5 8.4 3.9 2.6 1.4
1993 4.4 8.4 4.0 2.8
1994 4.4 8.5 4.2 2.6
1995 4.4 8.7 4.5 2.7 1.9
Table 2.3. Gross National Product per capita
Year Military expenditures by country in constant bill $ '. 995
Bulgaria Greece Romania Turkey Yugoslavia J
1985 7960 5343 9374 4890 5085
1986 8295 4787 9422 5676 5538
1987 8350 4863 9688 4230 5049
1988 7326 5052 8745 3860 5195
1989 7051 4786 8287 4049 3736
1990 4467 4806 4446 4968 4891
1991 1618 4625 4140 5388 3986
1992 1286 4882 2874 5849 3867
1993 1090 4845 1889 6406
1994 1007 4932 2233 6322 2973
1995 1073 5056 2520 6606
Table 2.4. Military expenditures by country
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Year Military Expenditures per GNP in % by country
Bulgaria Cjreece Romania Turkey' 1 Yugoslavia
1985 14.1 7.0 6.9 4.6 3.7
1986 14.3 6.2 6.8 4.9 3.9
1987 14.4 6.3 7.2 3.3 4.1
1988 12.2 6.3 6.2 2.9 3.8
1989 11.9 5.8 6.1 3.1 2.8
1990 8.6 5.8 3.7 3.5 4.0
1991 4.0 5.4 4.0 3.7 3.9
1992 3.2 5.7 3.3 3.8
1993 2.9 5.5 2.1 3.9
1994 2.7 5.6 2.4 4.0
1995 2.8 5.5 2.5 4.0
Table 2.5. Military expenditures per GNP by country




1985 890.0 538.0 417.0 97.0 220.0
1986 926.0 480.0 418.0 110.0 238.0
1987 931.0 487.0 428.0 80.0 216.0
1988 816.0 505.0 385.0 72.0 220.0
1989 784.0 477.0 364.0 74.0 158.0
1990 498.0 475.0 195.0 89.0 205.0
1991 181.0 450.0 182.0 94.0 167.0
1992 145.0 472.0 127.0 100.0
1993 128.0 466.0 84.0 108.0
1994 118.0 472.0 101.0 105.0 282.0
1995 125.0 482.0 115.0 108.0
Table 2.6. Military expenditures per capita
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Year Armed forces by country in thousands
Bulgaria ece R* Turkev = Y- -&
1985 189 201 237 814 258
1986 190 202 238 860 234
1987 191 199 248 879 234
1988 160 199 220 847 229
1989 150 201 207 780 225
1990 129 201 126 769 180
1991 107 205 201 804 169
1992 99 208 172 704 137
1993 52 213 167 686 100
1994 80 206 200 811 130
1995 86 213 209 805 130
Table 2.7. Armed forces by country
Year Armed Forces per 1,000 people [soldiers]
;
Bulgaria Greece Romania^ Turkey Yugoslavia
1985 21.2 20.2 10.5 16.1 11.2
1986 21.2 20.3 10.5 16.6 10.0
1987 21.3 19.9 11.0 16.6 10.0
1988 17.8 19.9 9.7 15.7 9.7
1989 16.6 20.0 9.1 14.2 9.5
1990 14.4 19.9 5.5 13.7 7.6
1991 12.0 19.9 8.8 14.1 7.1
1992 11.2 20.1 7.6 12.1 13.1
1993 6.1 20.5 7.4 11.6 9.5
1994 9.4 19.7 9.0 13.4 12.3
1995 10.0 20.3 9.5 13.1 12.3
Table 2.8. Armed forces per 1,000 people
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Year Arms Imports in million constant $ 1995
; Bulgaria Greece Romania Turkey Yugoslavia
1985 1302.0 397.0 55.0 685.0 41.0
1986 1735.0 280.0 667.0 934.0 53.0
1987 906.0 453.0 155.0 1553.0 809.0
1988 499.0 718.0 37.0 1373.0 62.0
1989 347.0 2277.0 12.0 1438.0 144.0
1990 776.0 506.0 948.0 1379.0 11.0
1991 0.0 287.0 188.0 1326.0 6.0
1992 0.0 780.0 32.0 1076.0 0.0
1993 5.0 891.0 0.0 1258.0 0.0
1994 0.0 482.0 0.0 1128.0 0.0
1995 0.0 825.0 0.0 700.0 0.0
Table 2.9. Arms imports by country
Year Arms Exports in million constant $ 1995
Bulgaria Greece ]
^9*~§s5!* Turkey Yugoslavia
1985 822.0 41.0 603.0 164.0 617.0
1986 601.0 53.0 440.0 0.0 414.0
1987 777.0 52.0 324.0 13.0 427.0
1988 537.0 25.0 275.0 12.0 312.0
1989 288.0 0.0 96.0 24.0 264.0
1990 92.0 23.0 0.0 11.0 322.0
1991 122.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 210.0
1992 129.0 20.0 22.0 22.0 0.0
1993 84.0 10.0 10.0 21.0 0.0
1994 62.0 5.0 41.0 31.0 0.0
1995 150.0 0.0 20.0 60.0 0.0
Table 2. 10. Arms exports by country
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6 Country ai bi Pi Si Ti ci di Eij Eij
7 Bulgaria 50 0.7 0.2 3 12.5 1.6 78% 0.22 0.4 0.12
8 Romania 115 0.7 0.2 3 28.75 0.5 78% 0.22 1 0.3
9 NATO-BP 220 0.7 0.2 3 55 0.2 78% 0.22 1 1
10
11 Perceived commitment from each country included in the model:
12
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Vector of countries' military expenditures:
Y = A * Y(N)
33 Yl=Yl(N)+cl*E12*Y2(N)+cl*E13*Y3(N)
34 Y2=c2*E2 1 *Yl(N)+Y2(N)+c2*E23 *Y3(N)
35 Y3=c3 *E3 1 *Yl(N)+c3 *E32*Y2(N)+Y3(N)
36
37
38 Vector of countries' Nash militaryexpenditures:
39
40 Y(N) = Inv(A) * Y
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48 1 2 3
49 1 1.00 0.31 0.09
50 2 0.78 1.00 0.23














Inverse ofA Vector Y
61 1 2 3
62 1 1.33 -0.39 -0.03 4.02
63 2 -0.97 1.50 -0.26 6.78


















Table of re suits:
75 Country Case Y Y(N) X U Y/G Y(N)/G %dY %dU
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Bulgaria Isolation 4.02 15.33 2.47 0.08
Nash 2.30 15.90 2.92 0.05 0.43 0.18
78
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Romania Isolation 6.78 36.07 5.82 0.06
Nash 3.08 37.31 6.69 0.03 0.55 0.13
80
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NATO-BP Isolation 12.38 69.21 10.57 0.06
Nash 8.20 70.60 11.49 0.04 0.34 0.09
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APPENDIX C. BULGARIA'S RELATIVE BENEFITS
G2 ME/GNP A in ME over isolation A in U over isolation
180 -2% -7% 1%
190 -2% -4% 2%
200 -2% -1% 3%
210 -2% 2% 4%
220 -2% 4% 5%
230 -1% 7% 6%
240 -1% 9% 7%
250 -1% 12% 8%
Table 3.11. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable G2
Where: G2 - GNP ofNATO-BP (Greece and Turkey)
,
ME/GNP = | Yi/Gi - Y2/G2
I
,
Difference in ME over isolation = AYi - AY2
,
Difference in Utility over isolation = AUi - AU2
.
Gl ME/GNP A in ME over isolation A in U over isolation
30 -1% 24% 17%
35 -1% 18% 13%
40 -1% 13% 9%
45 -1% 9% 7%
50 -2% 4% 5%
55 -2% 1% 3%
60 -2% -3% 2%
65 -2% -7% 0%
Table 3.12. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable Gl
Where: Gl - GNP ofBulgaria.
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T2 ME/GDP A inME over isolation A in U over isolation
0.2 -2% 4% 5%
0.4 -2% 4% 5%
0.6 -1% 5% 5%
0.8 -1% 6% 5%
1.0 -1% 7% 5%
1.2 -1% 7% 6%
1.4 -1% 8% 6%
1.6 -1% 9% 6%
Table 3.13. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable T2
Where: T2 - the threat perception ofNATO-BP.
El2 ME/GDP A inME over isolation A in U over isolation
0.08 -2% -6% 1%
0.10 -2% -1% 3%
0.12 -2% 4% 5%
0.14 -1% 10% 7%
0.16 -1% 15% 9%
0.18 0% 21% 11%
0.20 0% 27% 14%
Table 3.14. Bulgaria's benefit measures with variable En
Where: E12 - the perceived commitment from NATO-BP.
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